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kill, or sell food animals, and persons
who prepare and serve food. (More
than one third of the cases in China
with onset of SARS before February
1, 2003, were in food handlers [3].);
2) public transportation workers and
airline crew (4); and 3) laboratory
workers handling samples or items
contaminated with SARS-associated
coronavirus (5). In Singapore, 2 taxi
drivers were infected after ferrying
SARS patients to healthcare facilities,
and 1 Singapore Airlines cabin atten-
dant came down with the infection
after a flight with infected passengers
on board. Occupationally acquired
SARS infections have been docu-
mented in Singapore, Taiwan, and
Beijing. Clearly, occupational health
responses are needed in these occupa-
tional settings.
The recognition of SARS as an
occupational disease has broader
implications. Depending on country
legislation, persons who contract
SARS while performing their work
may be eligible for worker’s compen-
sation. Employers would be obligated
to provide a safe and healthy work-
place for their employees.
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Tracing SARS-
Coronavirus
Variant with Large
Genomic Deletion 
To the Editor: Severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) has been a
global public health issue (1). We
completed a study on the evolutionary
path of the SARS-associated coron-
avirus (SARS-CoV) during the
2002–2003 epidemic (2). Most human
SARS-CoV strains, as exemplified by
the Tor2 sequence (GenBank acces-
sion no. AY274119) (3), are character-
ized by the deletion of a 29-nucleotide
(nt) segment upstream of the nucleo-
capsid (N) gene domain when com-
pared with the viral strains isolated
from the earliest human SARS
patients (2) or from nonhuman mam-
malian hosts (4). Towards the end of
the epidemic, a variant of the SARS-
CoV with a deletion of 386 nt flank-
ing the 29-nt site was first demonstrat-
ed by complete genomic sequencing
in 2 patients in Hong Kong (GenBank
accession nos. AY394999, AY395000,
AY395001, AY395002) (2). The 386-
nt deleted segment corresponds to the
genomic region spanning residues
27719 to 28104 of the Tor2 sequence
(3). The deletion results in the disrup-
tion of a putative open reading frame,
orf 9, while eliminating orfs 10 and
11. This deletion variant was first
isolated from 2 SARS patients with
disease onset in mid-May 2003.
Patient A was a 41-year-old female
phlebotomist working in North
District Hospital, New Territories
East Cluster, Hong Kong. Patient B
was a 98-year-old woman admitted to
ward X of North District Hospital (2). 
With this finding late in the epi-
demic, we studied the prevalence of
this SARS-CoV variant to determine
its origin. Twenty-one SARS patients
with disease onset dates from mid-
April were identified. All cases had
been confirmed by positive reverse
transcription–polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) detection of SARS-
CoV RNA in clinical specimens or
seroconversion. These patients had
been admitted with SARS to 4 differ-
ent hospitals in Hong Kong, including
North District Hospital and hospitals
A and B, which were located in the
same geographic cluster as North
District Hospital, as well as hospital
C, which was geographically distant
from the other 3 hospitals. Clinical
specimens were retrieved, and RT-
PCR was performed to specifically
amplify a genomic segment of SARS-
CoV encompassing the deletion site.
Specimens with shortened PCR frag-
ments were sequenced to determine
the location and precise extent of the
deletion. 
RT-PCR products were not ob-
served in 2 specimens. Gel elec-
trophoresis of the RT-PCR products
for each of the remaining 19 speci-
mens showed a single genomic frag-
ment; 13 of these fragments were
shortened. Direct sequencing of the
short amplicons showed a deletion of
386 nt identical to that isolated from
patients A and B. The patients’ histo-
ries were reviewed. Patients A, B, and
the 13 patients appeared to be epi-
demiologically related. The epidemio-
logic relationships and clinical details
of the 15 cases are illustrated in the
Figure. Most of the cases were part
of a documented outbreak at North
District Hospital traceable to an
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85-year-old woman, L, in whom
SARS was not initially suspected but
was subsequently confirmed by sero-
conversion. Patient L had been admit-
ted to ward Y of North District
Hospital; subsequently SARS devel-
oped in 7 fellow inpatients (patients 3,
4, 5, 6, 8, D, and E) and 2 healthcare
workers (patients 7 and A) (Figure).
Patient A had been working in both
wards X and Y, and patient D was
transferred from ward Y to X before
symptom onset. Soon afterwards,
SARS developed in 2 other inpatients
(patients B and 11) in ward X
(Figure). Patient E was transferred
from ward Y to Z, where symptoms
later developed in another inpatient
(patient 2) (Figure). 
Patients 1, 9, and 10 had not been
admitted to North District Hospital
but were admitted directly to hospital
A. Patients 9 and 10 were household
contacts of patient 8 (Figure). Patient
1 had no documented contact with
other SARS patients, but coinciden-
tally, patients 1 and L resided in the
same estate, T, where a cluster of
SARS cases had been documented by
the local government (5). The deletion
variant was absent in 6 of the studied
cases. These case-patients had no
identifiable relationship with the
cohort of patients illustrated in the
Figure and did not reside in the same
geographic region as patients L and 1.
Three of the patients were admitted to
and treated in hospital C. None of the
6 patients had been admitted to North
District Hospital. 
Therefore, we have isolated a
SARS-CoV variant with the largest
genomic deletion reported to date in a
total of 15 SARS patients, 14 females
and 1 male, with ages ranging from 26
to 98 years (median 73 years)
(Figure). Nine (60%) of the 15
patients, 8 of whom were known
chronic disease patients, died
(Figure). This mortality rate is consis-
tent with previous observations where
the death rate in patients >65 years
generally exceeded 50% (1). Despite
the disruption of several putative orfs,
as evident from this study, this SARS-
CoV variant remained effective in
propagating among persons, particu-
larly in the healthcare setting. The
predicted orfs 9, 10, and 11 of the
SARS-CoV thus may not be function-
ally important, although further stud-
ies are required. We were able to doc-
ument 3 generations of transmission
and traced the first appearance of this
deletion variant to mid-April 2003,
possibly at Estate T. Investigation on
the origin of this enigmatic variant
should be continued by studying its
prevalence among the earlier human
SARS-CoV isolates and potential
mammalian hosts.
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Figure. Schematic illustration of the epidemiologic relationships between patients with the
severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) variant with the
386-nt deletion. Patients are grouped according to the most probable site where SARS
infection was acquired. Blocked arrows indicate the potential epidemiologic relationships
between subgroups of patients. Patients who are suspected of being an epidemiologic link
between particular subgroups are indicated by their association with the respective
blocked arrows. For each patient, “F” denotes female, and “M” denotes male, and age is
specified. The date of admission, followed by admission site in parentheses, and the ini-
tial complaint are indicated next. Additional noteworthy clinical information and the subse-
quent outcome of each case are indicated. *Patients with a history of chronic illness. †The
viral genotype was not characterized in patient L due to the lack of clinical specimens pos-
itive for SARS-CoV by reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction. CVA, cerebrovas-
cular accident; HCW, healthcare worker; E. coli, Escherichia coli.
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Multidrug-resistant
Salmonella Java 
To the Editor: Since 2000,
Salmonella enterica serovar Paratyphi
B variant Java (S. Java) with resist-
ance to antimicrobial drugs has been
isolated with increasing frequency
from patients in Scotland, England,
Wales, and the Channel Islands. For
England, Wales, and the Channel
Islands, drug-resistant S. Java was
found in humans: 25 in 2000, 36 in
2001, 49 in 2002, and 4 in 2003
(January 1–March 31). These isolates
made up 35% of 325 strains of S. Java
in human infections over the study
period (L.R. Ward, unpub. data). A
range of drug-resistant spectrums
(R-types) have been observed,
e.g., ASSpSuTm, ASSpSuTmCp,
ASSpSuTTm, ACSSpSuT (A, ampi-
cillin; C, chloramphenicol; S, strepto-
mycin; Sp, spectinomycin; Su,
sulphonamides; T, tetracyclines; Tm,
trimethoprim; Cp, ciprofloxacin) (1).
In general, isolates of S. Java of R-
types ASSpSuTm, ASSpSuTmCp,
and ASSpSuTTm, appear to be asso-
ciated with imported poultry. In con-
trast, infections with isolates of R-
type ACSSpSuT have not been associ-
ated with poultry, and organisms with
the ACSSpSuT resistant spectrum
have not been isolated from poultry in
the United Kingdom (R.H. Davies,
pers. comm.). 
In England, Wales, and the
Channel Islands, S. Java of R-type
ACSSpSuT was isolated from human
patients in 64 instances from 2000 to
2003 (5 in 2000, 22 in 2001, 34 in
2002, and 3 in 2003 [to March 31]).
None of these cases were related to
eating contaminated foods, and the
ACSSpSuT antibiogram has not been
isolated from strains of this serotype
from foods in the United Kingdom.
This resistance pattern corresponds to
that of the epidemic clone of S.
Typhimurium definitive phage type
(DT) 104 (DT 104 ACSSpSuT),
which caused many infections in
humans and food production animals
throughout Europe, the United States,
and Canada in the 1990s (1). In all
isolates of DT104 ACSSpSuT stud-
ied, from many different countries,
the resistant gene cluster has been
chromosomally integrated (1).
Resistances have been contained in a
13-kb cluster composed of 2 integrons
coding for resistance to SSp (1.0 kb)
and ASu (1.2 kb), with the genes for
resistance to chloramphenicol and
tetracyclines located between these
integrons (2,3). To investigate the
possibility of the horizontal transfer
of the ACSSpSuT gene cluster within
S. enterica, we have characterized the
resistance genes and associated struc-
tures in strains of S. Java of R-type
ACSSpSuT and compared them with
those in a strain of DT104 ACSSpSuT
From 2000 to 2002, a total of 20
isolates of S. Java of R-type
ACSSpSuT from patients in England
and Wales (18 isolates) and Scotland
(2 isolates) were characterized by
phage typing, plasmid profile typing,
and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE). Pulsed-field profiles of 3
additional isolates of S. Java of R-type
ACSSpSuT from Scotland were com-
pared with those of isolates from
England and Wales by the electronic
exchange of tagged image format files
(TIFFs) in a Bionumerics database.
Resistance genes were identified by
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) with
primers specific for blaTEM (A),
blaCARB-2 (A), cmlA (chlorampheni-
col/florfenicol), catI (C), catIII (C),
aadA2 (SSp), sul1 (Su), and tetG (T)
(4). The presence of class 1 integrons
was tested with the primers L1 and R1
(2). To identify the complete
ACSSpSuT resistance gene cluster,
long PCR was used on the basis of
amplifying a 10,041-bp fragment of
the DT104 isolate H3380 (4). Results
were compared with those of standard
strain of DT104 ACSSpSuT-
P3170700, and DT104 drug-sensi-
tive–P3343110 (4). 
Five unrelated phage types, – 1 var
3 (6 isolates), 3b var 2 (5), Dundee
(2), Worksop (3), and RDNC (4), and
3 closely-related pulsed-field types,
differing by only 1 to 3 of 14 bands in
the Xba1 PFGE profiles, were identi-
fied in the 20 isolates studied; 2 of
these pulsed-field types were
observed in the electronically trans-
mitted images of the 3 isolates from
Scotland. These pulsed-field profile
types have been designated
SPTJXB001 through SPTJXB003. Of
these, SPTJXB002 predominated,
being present in 11 of the isolates
studied, belonging to 3 phage types.
SPTJXB001 was identified in 8 iso-
lates of 3 phage types, and
SPTJXB003 in the remaining isolate.
PFGE type did not change over time.
All isolates were plasmid-free, and
resistances were not transferable,
either directly or by mobilization after
a self-conjugative plasmid was intro-
duced into the strains. By PCR, all
isolates possessed blaCARB-2, cmlA,
aadA2, sul1, and tetG but were nega-
tive for blaTEM, catI, and catIII. These
results corresponded to those of the
control DT104 ACSSpSuT strain
P3170700. When tested for class 1
integrons, all S. Java isolates of R-
type ACSSpSuT produced character-
istic amplicons of 1.0 and 1.2 kb, as
did P3170700, but not the drug-
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